Authors
Jon Williamson
University of Kent
Abstract
This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support to this version of objective Bayesianism.
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-019-0266-4
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References found in this work BETA

Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
Correcting the Guide to Objective Chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.

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