European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14 (2020)
AbstractThis paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support to this version of objective Bayesianism.
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Citations of this work
The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.
On the principal principle and imprecise subjective Bayesianism: A reply to Christian Wallmann and Jon Williamson.Marc Fischer - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-10.
On Imprecise Bayesianism in the Face of an Increasingly Larger Outcome Space.Marc Fischer - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):367-379.
Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
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References found in this work
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