Utilitas 13 (3):342 (2001)

If there is a moral reason for A to do X, and if A cannot do X without doing Y, and if doing Y will enable A to do X, then there is a moral reason for A to do Y. This principle is plausible but mysterious, so it needs to be explained. It can be explained by necessary enabler consequentialism, but not by other consequentialisms or any deontological moral theory. Or so I argue. Frances Howard-Snyder objects that this argument fails to establish consequentialism as understood by, because it fails to establish agent-neutrality. I respond by distinguishing consequentialism, which need not be agent-neutral, from utilitarianism, which claims agent-neutrality. Howard-Snyder also presents a schema for a non-consequentialist theory that is supposed to explain moral substitutability. I respond that her explanation cannot be completed without introducing incoherence into deontological moral theories
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820800003228
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References found in this work BETA

The Heart of Consequentialism.Frances Howard-Snyder - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (1):107 - 129.
An Argument for Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1992 - Philosophical Perspectives 6:399-421.
The right and the good.W. Ross - 1932 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 39 (2):11-12.

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The Case Against Consequentialism: Methodological Issues.Nikil Mukerji - 2013 - In Miguel Holtje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), GAP.8 Proceedings. GAP (2013). Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. pp. 654-665.

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