Ratio 14 (1):68–83 (2001)

Abstract
I contend that while at least one of the arguments advanced by Bernard Williams in his paper ‘Deciding To Believe’ does establish that beliefs, or more precisely, judgements cannot be decided upon ‘at will’, the notion of truth‐aimedness presupposed by that argument also, ironically, provides the key to understanding why judgements are necessarily voluntary
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00145
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.
Belief and Aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.
Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.
Believe What You Want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.

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