A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief

Studia Logica 49 (4):523 - 539 (1990)
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Abstract

In this paper non-normal worlds semantics is presented as a basic, general, and unifying approach to epistemic logic. The semantical framework of non-normal worlds is compared to the model theories of several logics for knowledge and belief that were recently developed in Artificial Intelligence (AI). It is shown that every model for implicit and explicit belief (Levesque), for awareness, general awareness, and local reasoning (Fagin and Halpern), and for awareness and principles (van der Hoek and Meyer) induces a non-normal worlds model validating precisely the same formulas (of the language in question).

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Heinrich Wansing
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Citations of this work

Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013):en ligne.
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The Fundamental Problem of Logical Omniscience.Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün & Francesco Berto - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):727-766.

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References found in this work

Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning.Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern - 1987 - Artificial Intelligence 34 (1):39-76.
Impossible possible worlds vindicated.Jaakko Hintikka - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (4):475 - 484.
Hyperintensional logic.M. J. Cresswell - 1975 - Studia Logica 34 (1):25 - 38.
Intensional logics and logical truth.M. J. Cresswell - 1972 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (1):2 - 15.

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