A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity

Topoi 31 (1):93-100 (2012)
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Abstract

Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is told about the truth or falsity of atomic sentences, A always receives the top-element of a certain partial order on non-ontic semantic values as its value. The ordering in question is a told-true order. Analogously, a formula A is logically false just in case no matter what is told about what is told about the truth or falsity of atomic sentences, A always receives the top-element of a certain told-false order as its value. Here, truth and falsity are pari passu , and it is the treatment of truth and falsity as independent of each other that leads to an informational interpretation of these notions in terms of a certain kind of higher-level information

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Author's Profile

Heinrich Wansing
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Citations of this work

Analytic Tableaux for all of SIXTEEN 3.Stefan Wintein & Reinhard Muskens - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (5):473-487.
What is a genuine intuitionistic notion of falsity?Yaroslav Shramko - 2012 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (1):3-23.

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