Authors
Xinli Wang
Juniata College
Abstract
The current discussions of conceptual schemes and related topics are misguided; for they are based on a tacit assumption that the difference between two schemes consists in the different distributions in truth-values. I argue that what should concern us, in the discussions of conceptual schemes and related issues, is not truth-values of assertions, but rather the truth-value-status of the sentences used to make the assertions. This is because the genuine conceptual innovation between alternative theories or languages does not lie in differences in determining truth-values of their sentences, but turns on whether these sentences have truth-values when considered within the context of a competing one. This new interpretation of the notion of conceptual schemes, which I refer to as presuppositional languages, is not only good in itself—for establishing the intelligibility and tenability of the notion—but quite beneficial in its effect on other related issues.
Keywords conceptual schemes  presupposition  presuppositional language
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Reprint years 2007, 2007 reprint
DOI 10.5840/wcp2120076193
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Method.H. G. Gadamer - 1975 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36 (4):487-490.
Language, Thought and Reality.Benjamin Lee Whorf, John B. Carroll & Stuart Chase - 1956 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (4):695-695.
Culture; A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.Abraham Edel - 1954 - Journal of Philosophy 51 (19):559-563.
An Essay on Metaphysics.C. J. Ducasse - 1941 - Philosophical Review 50 (6):639.
Three Kinds of Incommensurability.David B. Wong - 1989 - In M. Krausz (ed.), Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation. Notre Dame University Press. pp. 140--58.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Propositional Vs. Hermeneutic Models of Cross-Cultural Understanding.Xinli Wang & Ling Xu - 2009 - South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):312-331.

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