Hume Is Not A Skeptic about Induction

Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico 36 (78):41-54 (2001)
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Abstract

On the basis of the distinction between logical and factual probability, epistemic justification is distinguished from logical justification of induction. It is argued that, contrary to the accepted interpretation of Hume, Hume believes that inductive inferences are epistemically legitimate and justifiable. Hence the beliefs arrived at via (correct) inductive inferences are rational beliefs. According to this interpretation, Hume is not a radical skeptic about induction.

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Xinli Wang
Juniata College

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