Kant's Argument for the Principle of Anticipations of Perception

Philosophical Forum 49 (1):61-81 (2018)
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Abstract

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents the Principle of Anticipations of Perception as follows: ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of the sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.’ This paper defends the tenability and coherence of Kant’s argument by solving three prominent difficulties identified by commentators. Firstly, on my interpretation, the schema of the category of ‘limitation’ presents an infinite sphere of possible realities, which provides the transcendental basis for the Principle. Secondly, I take Kant’s otherwise problematic examples of intensive magnitudes to show how we determine a degree according to an ordinal sequence that is constituted by cardinal quantities. Thirdly, I distinguish in Kant’s writings the categorical continuity concerning the a priori principle and the empirical continuity concerning a posteriori sensations. While the former is necessary, the latter is merely possible; but we must nevertheless assume the latter as a cognitive aim.

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Citations of this work

Kant-Bibliographie 2018.Margit Ruffing - 2020 - Kant Studien 111 (4):647-702.
Kant on the Mathematical Deficiency of Psychology.Michael Bennett McNulty - 2022 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 12 (2):485-509.

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