On Kant's Persistent Stance on Imagination

Modern Philosophy 2:109-113 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, the imagination in Kant's critical philosophy in the inconsistency of expression, imagination and reason from the perspective of the universal law a comprehensive review of Kant's imagination position on the issue of consistency. In the field of knowledge, imagination played a comprehensive role; in the practice areas, creating imagination played a role; in the field of aesthetic, imaginative play the role of free association. In either case, the universal law of all rational imagination was fundamental to the statute. In face of the inconsistent expression of imagination throughout Kant's critical philosophy, this thesis aims at a reexamination of Kant's consistent stance on the subject of imagination from the perspective of the universal principles of reason. In the domain of epistemology, imagination functions as a synthesizing force ; in the practical domain, imagination is chiefly intended for creation; in the aesthetic domain, imagination functions as free association. In any case, imagination is subject to the constraint from the universal principles of reason

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,441

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kant on the imagination and geometrical certainty.Mary Domski - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (4):409-431.
Imagination.Fiora Salis - 2014 - Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.
Crossing the line: Sellars on Kant on imagination.Luca Corti - 2012 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):41-71.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-05

Downloads
1 (#1,714,401)

6 months
1 (#869,379)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references