Dieter Wandschneider
Rwth Aachen University, Germany
The center of this investigation is the hard problem of phenomenal perception. To be clear, hereby it is thought of higher animals; accordingly the problem of Human consciousness will explicitly not be treated. The so-called explanatory gap (Levine), i.e. missing a neural explanation of experiences, here is emergence-theoretically countered: It is argued that systems own properties and laws different from those of their components. Applied to the brain the phenomenal character of perception is explained as an emergence effect from the systemic cooperation of perception, valuation and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. As is further shown, feelings are to be understood as a necessary completion of perception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception.
Keywords hard problem  chalmers  phenomenal perception  anomal monism  emergence  principle of self-preservation  feeling
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