Kantian Review 20 (2):301-311 (2015)

Authors
Owen Ware
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Abstract
In this article I offer a critical commentary on Jeanine Grenberg’s claim that, by the time of the second Critique, Kant was committed to the view that we only access the moral law’s validity through the feeling of respect. The issue turns on how we understand Kant’s assertion that our consciousness of the moral law is a ‘fact of reason’. Grenberg argues that all facts must be forced, and anything forced must be felt. I defend an alternative interpretation, according to which the fact of reason refers to the actuality of our moral consciousness.
Keywords Kant  Grenberg  fact of reason  feeling of respect  moral justification
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DOI 10.1017/s1369415415000060
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References found in this work BETA

Practical Philosophy.Immanuel Kant - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.Wolfgang Schwarz - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):449-451.
Kant's Theory of Freedom.Henry E. Allison - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.Martin Heidegger - 1982 - Indiana University Press.
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology.M. Heidegger - 1982 - In Trans Albert Hofstadter (ed.).

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Citations of this work BETA

Rethinking Kant's Fact of Reason.Owen Ware - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
Moral Education and Transcendental Idealism.Joe Saunders & Martin Sticker - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (4):646-673.
Kantian Self-Conceit and the Two Guises of Authority.Francey Russell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):268-283.
Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom, Transcendental Idealism, and the Third-Person.Joe Saunders - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):164-182.

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