Berkeley's moral philosophy

Journal of Medical Ethics 16 (1):48-50 (1990)
Berkeley held that the moral duty of mankind was to obey God's laws; that--since God was a benevolent Creator--the object of His laws must be to promote the welfare and flourishing of mankind; and that, accordingly, humans could identify their moral duties by asking what system of laws for conduct would in fact tend to promote that object. This position--which is akin to that of 'rule' Utilitarianism--is neither unfamiliar nor manifestly untenable. He was surely mistaken, however, in his further supposition that, if this theory were accepted, the resolution of all (or most) particular moral dilemmas would be simple and straightforward
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DOI 10.1136/jme.16.1.48
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