Explanation and the New Riddle of Induction

Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):365-385 (2012)
I propose a novel solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction, one on which aspects of scientific methodology preclude significant confirmation of the Grue Hypothesis. The solution appeals to intuitive constraints on the confirmation of explanatory hypotheses, and can be construed as a fragment of a theory of Inference to the Best Explanation. I give it an objective Bayesian formalisation, and contrast it with Goodman's and Sober's solutions, which make appeal to both methodological and non-methodological considerations, and those of Jackson, Godfrey-Smith, and White, on which explanatory considerations play a very different role
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00044.x
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