Review of Metaphysics 40 (4):787-789 (1987)

Andrew Ward
University of Minnesota
This book is concerned with discovering the necessary and sufficient conditions for a person's being justified in believing propositions about the empirical world and for propositions about the empirical world being justified for a person. Within this context, the problem that serves as the focus for the book is "the epistemic regress problem." Briefly, the problem starts with the assumption that a person S is justified in believing that a proposition P1 is true because S is justified in believing that proposition P1 is true and P1 entails P0. But what justifies S's belief that P1 is true? Moser suggests that there are at least four possible accounts of inferential justification: inferential justification via infinite regresses, inferential justification via justificatory circles of some sort, inferential justification via the unjustified and inferential justification via immediate justification. Following his introductory chapter, where the parameters within which the discussion will proceed are concisely laid out, Moser considers the merits of each position before finally opting for a version of foundationalism he calls "epistemic intuitionism."
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph198740452
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