Epistemology versus non-causal realism

Synthese 194 (5) (2017)
Abstract
This paper formulates a general epistemological argument against what I call non-causal realism, generalizing domain specific arguments by Benacerraf, Field, and others. First I lay out the background to the argument, making a number of distinctions that are sometimes missed in discussions of epistemological arguments against realism. Then I define the target of the argument—non-causal realism—and argue that any non-causal realist theory, no matter the subject matter, cannot be given a reasonable epistemology and so should be rejected. Finally I discuss and respond to several possible responses to the argument. In addition to clearing up and avoiding numerous misunderstandings of arguments of this kind that are quite common in the literature, this paper aims to present and endorse a rigorous and fully general epistemological argument against realism
Keywords Epistemological arguments against realism  Reliability challenge  Realism  Epistemology
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-1010-z
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References found in this work BETA
On What Matters.Parfit Derek - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Expressivism and the Reliability Challenge.Camil Golub - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):797-811.

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