Functionalism About Inference

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Inferences are familiar movements of thought, but despite important recent work on the topic, we do not yet have a fully satisfying theory of inference. Here I provide a functionalist theory of inference. I argue that the functionalist framework allows us the flexibility to meet various demands on a theory of inference that have been proposed (such as that it must explain inferential Moorean phenomena and epistemological ‘taking’). While also allowing us to compare, contrast, adapt, and combine features of extant theories of inference into one unified theory. In fleshing out the inference role, I also criticize the common assumption that inference requires rule-following.



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Jared Warren
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.
Logical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - forthcoming - In Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, Florian Steinberger & Filippo Ferrari (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Killing Kripkenstein's Monster.Jared Warren - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):257-289.
Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.
Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.

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