Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407 (2021)
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Abstract |
Our relationship to the infinite is controversial. But it is widely agreed that our powers of reasoning are finite. I
disagree with this consensus; I think that we can, and perhaps do, engage in infinite reasoning. Many think it is just
obvious that we can't reason infinitely. This is mistaken. Infinite reasoning does not require constructing infinitely
long proofs, nor would it gift us with non-recursive mental powers. To reason infinitely we only need an ability to
perform infinite inferences. I argue that we have this ability. My argument looks to our best current theories of inference
and considers examples of apparent infinite reasoning. My position is controversial, but if I'm right, our theories of
truth, mathematics, and beyond could be transformed. And even if I'm wrong, a more careful consideration of infinite
reasoning can only deepen our understanding of thinking and reasoning.
(Note for readers: the paper's brief discussion of uniform reflection and omega inconsistency is misleading. The imagined interlocutor's argument makes an assumption about the PA-provability of provability generalizations that, while true for the Godel sentence's instances, is unjustified, in general. This means my position is stronger against this objection than the paper suggests, since omega inconsistent theories are not automatically inconsistent with their uniform reflection principles, you also need to assume the arithmetically true Pi-2 sentences.)
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Keywords | Arithmetic Infinity Inference Omega Rule Reasoning Rule‐following Truth |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12694 |
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
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