Logical Conventionalism

In Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, Florian Steinberger & Filippo Ferrari (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Once upon a time, logical conventionalism was the most popular philosophical theory of logic. It was heavily favored by empiricists, logical positivists, and naturalists. According to logical conventionalism, linguistic conventions explain logical truth, validity, and modality. And conventions themselves are merely syntactic rules of language use, including inference rules. Logical conventionalism promised to eliminate mystery from the philosophy of logic by showing that both the metaphysics and epistemology of logic fit into a scientific picture of reality. For naturalists of all stripes, this was paradise. Alas, paradise was lost. By the end of the twentieth century, logical conventionalism had been almost universally abandoned. But more recently, it has been revitalized. This chapter provides an overview of logical conventionalism and its history, clears away misunderstandings, and briefly responds to both the canonical objections to conventionalism (from Quine, Dummett, Boghossian, and many others) as well as new objections (from Field and Golan). From paradise lost, to paradise regained: logical conventionalism is back.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

An Empirical Route to Logical 'Conventionalism'.Eugene Chua - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10455. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. pp. 631-636.
Logical Conventionalism and the Adoption Problem.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):47-81.
Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.
Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism.Pavel Arazim - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (2):151-174.
Carnap, Conventions, and Circularity.Carl Egerton - 2013 - Discipline filosofiche. 23 (1):79-98.
Sulla relatività logica.Achille C. Varzi - 2004 - In Massimiliano Carrara & Pierdaniele Giaretta (eds.), Filosofia e logica. Rubbettino Editore. pp. 135–173.
Wittgenstein and logical necessity.A. B. Levison - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):367-373.


Added to PP

229 (#65,305)

6 months
229 (#4,048)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jared Warren
Stanford University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

View all 92 references / Add more references