Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2851-2859 (2020)

Authors
Jared Warren
Stanford University
Abstract
The standard account of ontological commitment is quantificational. There are many old and well-chewed-over challenges to the account, but recently Kit Fine added a new challenge. Fine claimed that the ‘‘quantificational account gets the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong’’ and offered an alternative account that used an existence predicate. While Fine’s argument does point to a real lacuna in the standard approach, I show that his own account also gets ‘‘the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong’’. In response, I offer a full quantificational account, using the resources of plural logic, and argue that it leads to a complete theory of natural language ontological commitment.
Keywords ontological commitment  plural quantification  Quine  Kit Fine
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-019-01342-9
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References found in this work BETA

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
The Question of Realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.
Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.
Parts of Classes.David K. Lewis - 1991 - Mind 100 (3):394-397.
Plural Logic.Alex Oliver & Timothy Smiley - 2013 - Oxford University Press UK.

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