Ontological Commitment and Ontological Commitments

Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2851-2859 (2020)
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Abstract

The standard account of ontological commitment is quantificational. There are many old and well-chewed-over challenges to the account, but recently Kit Fine added a new challenge. Fine claimed that the ‘‘quantificational account gets the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong’’ and offered an alternative account that used an existence predicate. While Fine’s argument does point to a real lacuna in the standard approach, I show that his own account also gets ‘‘the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong’’. In response, I offer a full quantificational account, using the resources of plural logic, and argue that it leads to a complete theory of natural language ontological commitment.

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Jared Warren
Stanford University

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References found in this work

On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.
Nonexistent Objects.Terence Parsons - 1980 - Yale University Press.

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