Superlongevity and African Ethics

Journal of Applied Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

I apply African moral precepts to the topic of ‘superlongevity’. I make the case that African theories give rise to three specific sorts of moral concern about life extension that are distinct from similar objections in Western literature: first, superlongevity presents a challenge to identity; second, significantly longer lives face increased challenges to their meaningfulness; third, life extension may be socially divisive, undermining key tenets of sharing a way of life and communing harmoniously with others. Although these distinctive concerns are significant, I claim that their strength as objections to superlongevity depends heavily on the distribution of life extension technologies. Moreover, since African theories typically hold that moral excellence correlates with increasing age, they provide a prudential and moral incentive to live longer to develop personhood.

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Christopher Wareham
Utrecht University

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References found in this work

Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.
Personhood and a Meaningful Life in African Philosophy.Motsamai Molefe - 2020 - South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (2): 194-207.
Artificial intelligence and African conceptions of personhood.C. S. Wareham - 2021 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):127-136.

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