The Independence Solution to Grue

Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1305-1326 (2023)
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Abstract

The paper presents a comprehensive solution to the new riddle of induction. Gruesome induction is blocked because “grue” is not independent of our sampling and observation methods. Before presenting my theory, I critically survey previous versions of what I call the “independence strategy”, tracing the strategy to three different papers from the 1970s by (respectively) Wilkerson, Moreland, and Jackson. Next I critically examine recent approaches by Okasha, Godfrey-Smith, Schramm, and Freitag. All of these approaches have their virtues, but none of them rules out every problem case. Nor do any of them alone explain exactly what goes wrong in all types of gruesome reasoning. My account aims to do both. Learning lessons from my criticisms of previous theories, I argue that there are several crucial types of independence. All of them are needed to rule out every problem case. I close by suggesting that the independence solution can also be adopted by proponents of other approaches—Bayesians, fans of natural kinds, and pragmatists.

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Jared Warren
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Reference Magnetism Does Not Exist.Jared Warren - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-9.

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.
The inference to the best explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.

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