Humean supervenience and personal identity

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593 (2005)
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Abstract

Humeans hold that the nomological features of our world, including causal facts, are determined by the global distribution of fundamental properties. Since persistence presupposes causation, it follows that facts about personal identity are also globally determined. I argue that this is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the doctrine of Humean supervenience should therefore be rejected

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Ryan Wasserman
Western Washington University

Citations of this work

Where in the relativistic world are we?Cody Gilmore - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Primitivism About Intrinsicality.Alexander Skiles - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 221-252.
Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
Fission, fusion and intrinsic facts.Katherine Hawley - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.

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References found in this work

Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
Causation as influence.David K. Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Extrinsic properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
Counterfactuals and comparative possibility.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):418-446.

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