Humean supervenience and personal identity
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):582-593 (2005)
Abstract
Humeans hold that the nomological features of our world, including causal facts, are determined by the global distribution of fundamental properties. Since persistence presupposes causation, it follows that facts about personal identity are also globally determined. I argue that this is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the doctrine of Humean supervenience should therefore be rejectedAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00417.x
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Citations of this work
Where in the relativistic world are we?Cody Gilmore - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):199–236.
Primitivism About Intrinsicality.Alexander Skiles - 2014 - In Robert M. Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 221-252.
Fission, fusion and intrinsic facts.Katherine Hawley - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):602-621.
References found in this work
Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Reprinted with Postscripts In.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2.
Counterfactuals and comparative possibility.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (4):418-446.