Intentional action and the unintentional fallacy

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534 (2011)
Abstract
Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01410.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,553
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.
The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Thoemmes Press.
Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Unintentional Consent.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2015 - Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):86-95.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-08-03

Total downloads

113 ( #43,481 of 2,168,179 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #127,274 of 2,168,179 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums