Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534 (2011)
Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
Citations of this work BETA
Unintentional Consent.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2015 - Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):86-95.
Lying as a Violation of Grice's First Maxim of Quality.Don Fallis - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):563-581.
Armchair Methodology and Epistemological Naturalism.Janet Levin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4117-4136.
On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did Not Believe or Want ….Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (1):96-119.
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