Intentional action and the unintentional fallacy

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):524-534 (2011)
Much of the recent work in action theory can be organized around a set of objections facing the Simple View and other intention-based accounts of intentional action. In this paper, I review three of the most popular objections to the Simple View and argue that all three objections commit a common fallacy. I then draw some more general conclusions about the relationship between intentional action and moral responsibility
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01410.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,495
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
On Action.Carl Ginet - 2012 - Cambridge University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
A Natural History of Negation.Laurence Horn - 1989 - University of Chicago Press.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Unintentional Consent.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2015 - Kritike 9 (1):86-95.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
120 ( #43,310 of 2,210,574 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #54,716 of 2,210,574 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature