Intrinsic cognitive models

Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283 (2003)
Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction and manipulation of the cognitive equivalent of scale models. A reading of this hypothesis is provided that satisfies condition (1) and which, even though it may not fully satisfy condition (2), turns out (in light of the frame problem) to be the only known way to satisfy condition (3).
Keywords Cognitive  Epistemology  Frame  Inference  Language  Model  Representation  Thought  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1207/s15516709cog2702_5
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References found in this work BETA
Image and Mind.Stephen M. Kosslyn - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions Through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms.Jonathan Waskan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
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Maps, Languages, and Manguages: Rival Cognitive Architectures?Kent Johnson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):815-836.

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