David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283 (2003)
Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction and manipulation of the cognitive equivalent of scale models. A reading of this hypothesis is provided that satisfies condition (1) and which, even though it may not fully satisfy condition (2), turns out (in light of the frame problem) to be the only known way to satisfy condition (3).
|Keywords||Cognitive Epistemology Frame Inference Language Model Representation Thought Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar (2013). Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition. Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
Jonathan Waskan (2008). Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions Through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
Richard Samuels (2010). Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.
Jonathan Waskan (2011). A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia (a Gift to Computationalists). Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103 - 125.
Kent Johnson (2015). Maps, Languages, and Manguages: Rival Cognitive Architectures? Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):815-836.
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