Cognitive Science 27 (2):259-283 (2003)
Theories concerning the structure, or format, of mental representation should (1) be formulated in mechanistic, rather than metaphorical terms; (2) do justice to several philosophical intuitions about mental representation; and (3) explain the human capacity to predict the consequences of worldly alterations (i.e., to think before we act). The hypothesis that thinking involves the application of syntax-sensitive inference rules to syntactically structured mental representations has been said to satisfy all three conditions. An alternative hypothesis is that thinking requires the construction and manipulation of the cognitive equivalent of scale models. A reading of this hypothesis is provided that satisfies condition (1) and which, even though it may not fully satisfy condition (2), turns out (in light of the frame problem) to be the only known way to satisfy condition (3).
|Keywords||Cognitive Epistemology Frame Inference Language Model Representation Thought Fodor, J|
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References found in this work BETA
The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sonya Bahar - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (3):453-488.
Knowledge of Counterfactual Interventions Through Cognitive Models of Mechanisms.Jonathan Waskan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):259 – 275.
Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance.Richard Samuels - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.
A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia (a Gift to Computationalists).Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103 - 125.
Maps, Languages, and Manguages: Rival Cognitive Architectures?Kent Johnson - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):815-836.
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