Knowledge of counterfactual interventions through cognitive models of mechanisms

Here I consider the relative merits of two recent models of explanation, James Woodward's interventionist-counterfactual model and the model model. According to the former, explanations are largely constituted by information about the consequences of counterfactual interventions. Problems arise for this approach because countless relevant interventions are possible in most cases and because it overlooks other kinds of equally relevant information. According the model model, explanations are largely constituted by cognitive models of actual mechanisms. On this approach, explanations tend not to represent any of the aforementioned information explicitly but can instead be used to produce it on demand. The model model thus offers the more plausible account of the information of which we are aware when we have an explanation and of the ratiocinative process through which we derive many kinds of information that are relevant to the evaluation of explanations.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02698590802567308
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,848
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation.Stuart Glennan - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S342-353.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception.Cory Wright - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
A Vehicular Theory of Corporeal Qualia.Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103-125.
Mechanistic Explanation at the Limit.Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):389-408.
Natural Selection and Mechanistic Regularity.Lane DesAutels - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 57:13-23.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
163 ( #31,269 of 2,210,502 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #29,772 of 2,210,502 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature