Resource bounded belief revision

Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):429-446 (1999)

Abstract

The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are currently active and whether they are fully accepted or provisional. Then we define a set of basic operations that change the status of beliefs and show how these operations can be used to model agents with different capacities. We also show how different operations of belief change described in the literature can be seen as special cases of our theory.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,855

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
43 (#267,675)

6 months
1 (#386,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating.Sven Ove Hansson - 1999 - Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1995 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

A Formal Model of Multi-Agent Belief-Interaction.John Cantwell - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (4):397-422.
Infinitary Belief Revision.Dongmo Zhang & Norman Foo - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (6):525-570.
Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework.Giacomo Bonanno - 2008 - In Krzysztof Apt & Robert van Rooij (eds.), New Perspectives on Games and Interaction. Amsterdam University Press.
On the Logic of Iterated Belief Revision.Adnan Darwiche & Judea Pearl - 1997 - Artificial Intelligence 89 (1-2):1-29.
Reversing the Levi Identity.Sven Ove Hansson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):637 - 669.
Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.