Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):429-446 (1999)

Abstract
The AGM paradigm for belief revision provides a very elegant and powerful framework for reasoning about idealized agents. The paradigm assumes that the modeled agent is a perfect reasoner with infinite memory. In this paper we propose a framework to reason about non-ideal agents that generalizes the AGM paradigm. We first introduce a structure to represent an agent's belief states that distinguishes different status of beliefs according to whether or not they are explicitly represented, whether they are currently active and whether they are fully accepted or provisional. Then we define a set of basic operations that change the status of beliefs and show how these operations can be used to model agents with different capacities. We also show how different operations of belief change described in the literature can be seen as special cases of our theory.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005565603303
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References found in this work BETA

Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1995 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.

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Citations of this work BETA

AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.

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