The argument from temporary intrinsics

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419 (2003)
Abstract
The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.
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DOI 10.1080/713659708
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A Return to the Analogy of Being.Kris McDaniel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Against Non‐Ludovician Time.Robert E. Pezet - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (4):330-359.

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