The argument from temporary intrinsics

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):413 – 419 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The problem of temporary intrinsics is the problem of how persisting objects can have different intrinsic properties at different times. The relativizer responds to this problem by replacing ordinary intrinsic properties with relations to times. In this note, I identify and respond to three different objections to the relativizer's proposal, each of which can be traced to the work of David Lewis.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-05-07

Downloads
180 (#69,072)

6 months
8 (#96,308)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ryan Wasserman
Western Washington University

Citations of this work

A Return to the Analogy of Being.Kris Mcdaniel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):688 - 717.
Endurantism and Perdurantism.Nikk Effingham - 2012 - In Robert Barnard Neil Manson (ed.), Continuum Companion to Metaphysics. pp. 170.
Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.

View all 33 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.

Add more references