Oxford University Press (2004)
Since the 1970s Gary Watson has published a series of brilliant and highly influential essays on human action, examining such questions as: in what ways are we free and not free, rational and irrational, responsible or not for what we do? Moral philosophers and philosophers of action will welcome this collection, representing one of the most important bodies of work in the field.
|Keywords||Agent (Philosophy Free will and determinism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$40.00 used (74% off) $85.18 new (44% off) $150.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD450.W297 2004|
|ISBN(s)||0199272271 9780199272273 9780199272280|
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A Theory of the Normative Force of Pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.
On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility.Nicole A. Vincent - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):77-98.
The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.
Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo.David Faraci & David Shoemaker - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
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