バーナード・ウィリアムズの功利主義批判再考 (Bernard Williams’ Critique of Utilitarianism Reconsidered)

Japanese Student Research Notes of Philosophy of Science 4:17-25 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This research discusses Bernard Williams' critique of utilitarianism. I will address Williams' well-known “Integrity Objection” and clarify where his main issue with utilitarianism lies. Through this, I will demonstrate that the separation of the two viewpoints – the “inside viewpoint” and the “impartial viewpoint” - is the issue, as the utilitarian impartial viewpoint does not capture the value of ethical deliberations based on our inside viewpoint in which we presuppose our personal projects. Furthermore, I will argue that this interpretation enables us to place the objection in the context of the critique of impartiality which is one of the central themes of Williams’ ethics.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-09-02

Downloads
556 (#47,857)

6 months
100 (#57,439)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kazuki Watanabe
University of Tokyo

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reference and definite descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Languages of Art.Nelson Goodman - 1970 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (1):62-63.
The view from nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (2):221-222.

View all 53 references / Add more references