Is attention a non-propositional attitude?

In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

Authors
Sebastian Watzl
University of Oslo
Abstract
I argue first that attention is a (maybe the) paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode. In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude. It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move is one away from an atomistic, building block picture to a more holistic, structural picture.
Keywords Non-propositional attitudes  attention  mental structure
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
The Objects of Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Obscure Object of Hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes.Sørenarnow H. Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
Against Essential Normativity of the Mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Belief-That and Belief-In: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 192-213.
Propositional Attitudes.Timothy Schroeder - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.
The Mental States of Persons and Their Brains.Tim Crane - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:253-270.
Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.
Modality and Propositional Attitudes.Michael Hegarty - 2016 - Cambridge University Press.
The Normativity of the Mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
Hare and Others on the Proposition.John Corcoran - 2011 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 15 (1):51-76.
Naturalismo E Soggettività.Alfredo Paternoster - 2009 - Etica E Politica 11 (2):142-161.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-05-11

Total views
154 ( #49,117 of 2,264,819 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #11,352 of 2,264,819 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature