Abstract

This dissertation investigates the role of modality in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, both in terms of the results arrived at within his transcendental framework and in the articulation of that very framework itself. As a reflective theory of a priori knowledge, transcendental philosophy possesses a methodological approach to the a priori "possibility of experience" which can enjoy legitimacy only if its transcendental use of modality can be rendered consistent with the critically limited sense of modality accorded to it in the "Postulates of Empirical Thought". Otherwise, transcendental philosophy is in danger of undermining the very terms by which it articulates itself. Unfortunately, the dominant interpretation criticizes the Kantian principles of modality on the grounds that they merely reiterate the transcendental analytic's previous results and so lack independent content. Challenging this dominant reading, this dissertation interprets Kant's transcendental theory of modality in a novel light, locating modality's function at the systematic and methodological heart of Kant's transcendental enterprise. Transcendental modality performs a double role, defining the formal, yet extra-logical or "weighty" notion of "object in general" so fundamental to transcendental philosophy, while simultaneously expressing the "subjectively-synthetic" or reflective character of that determination as a function of the object's relation to the faculties of objective knowledge. In light of this analysis, the dissertation seeks to develop an account of the dependency of transcendental philosophy as a reflective theory of a priori knowledge on this reflexive, double role of modality. In sum, the dissertation tries to show how modality's exceptional status can be interpreted as integral to a viable grounding of transcendental reflection within the context of the Critique's own conclusions, and thus as the fulfillment of the philosophical demand for systematic self justification