Relevance logic brings hope to hypothetico-deductivism

Philosophy of Science 54 (3):453-464 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Clark Glymour has argued that hypothetico-deductivism, which many take to be an important method of scientific confirmation, is hopeless because it cannot be reconstructed in classical logic. Such reconstructions, as Glymour points out, fail to uphold the condition of relevance between theory and evidence. I argue that the source of the irrelevant confirmations licensed by these reconstructions lies not with hypothetico-deductivism itself, but with the classical logic in which it is typically reconstructed. I present a new reconstruction of hypothetico-deductivism in relevance logic that does maintain the condition of relevance between theory and evidence. Hence, if hypothetico-deductivism is an important rationale in science, we have good reason to believe that the logic underlying scientific discourse is captured better by relevance logic than by its classical counterpart

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,509

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Glymour on Evidential Relevance.David Christensen - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):471-481.
Horwich, Hempel, and Hypothetico-Deductivism.Ken Gemes - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):699-702.
Hypothetico-Deductivism is Hopeless.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):322-325.
Schurz on Hypothetico-Deductivism.Ken Gemes - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (2):171 - 181.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
37 (#313,068)

6 months
1 (#417,896)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

C. Kenneth Waters
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.
The Irrelevance of Bootstrapping.David Christensen - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (4):644-662.
Truth, Content, and the Hypothetico-Deductive Method.Thomas R. Grimes - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):514-522.
Discoverers' Induction.Laura J. Snyder - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):580-604.
Solving the Tacking Problem with Contrast Classes.Jake Chandler - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (3):489-502.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Hypothetico-Deductivism is Hopeless.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):322-325.
E, R, and Γ.Robert K. Meyer & J. Michael Dunn - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (3):460-474.
E, R And.Robert K. Meyer - 1969 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 34:460.
Confirmation and Prediction.G. H. Merrill - 1979 - Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.

Add more references