Soft libertarianism and hard compatibilism

Journal of Ethics 3 (4):351-365 (1999)
In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane''s work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options.
Keywords Compatibilism  Libertarianism  Frankfurt, H
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DOI 10.1023/A:1009819618482
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Robert Allen (1999). Re-Examining Frankfurt Cases. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):363-376.

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