In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford Clarendon Press (2003)

Authors
Gary Watson
University of Southern California
Abstract
The first part of the essay explores the relations between the will and practical reason or judgement. The second part takes up decision in the realm of belief, i.e. deciding that such and such is so. This phenomenon raises two questions. Since we decide that as well as to, should we speak of a doxastic will? Secondly, should we regard ourselves as active in the formation of our judgements as in the formation of our intentions? The author's answer to these two further questions is ‘no’ and ‘yes’, respectively: the boundaries between the active and the passive are not marked by the will.
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DOI 10.1093/0199257361.003.0008
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Intellectual Isolation.Jeremy David Fix - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):491-520.

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