Hume's Quandary Concerning Personal Identity

Hume Studies 18 (2):233-253 (1992)
Abstract
Hume's Treatise Book III appendix on personal identity is analyzed as concerned with a difficulty not with the Book I account of personal identity as such (the self as product of associational imagination) but a presupposition of that account: the succession of perceptions present to consciousness (which the imagination associates, thus giving to the fiction of an identity). It is then claimed that while Hume's theory of imagination offers no way out of quandary, Kantian imagination-based transcendental idealism does
Keywords Hume
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DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0427
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