Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121 (1995)

Authors
Andrew Wayne
University of Guelph
Abstract
A common methodological adage holds that diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence. Proponents of Bayesian approaches to scientific reasoning such as Horwich, Howson and Urbach, and Earman claim to offer both a precise rendering of this maxim in probabilistic terms and an explanation of why the maxim should be part of the methodological canon of good science. This paper contends that these claims are mistaken and that, at best, Bayesian accounts of diverse evidence are crucially incomplete. This failure should lend renewed force to a long-neglected global worry about Bayesian approaches
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DOI 10.1086/289842
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References found in this work BETA

Bayes or Bust?John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (3):314-318.
Why Do Scientists Prefer to Vary Their Experiments?Allan Franklin - 1984 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (1):51.

View all 7 references / Add more references

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