Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818 (2016)

Authors
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Abstract
Evidentialism is the thesis that all reasons to believe p are evidence for p. Pragmatists hold that pragmatic considerations – incentives for believing – can also be reasons to believe. Nishi Shah, Thomas Kelly and others have argued for evidentialism on the grounds that incentives for belief fail a ‘reasoning constraint’ on reasons: roughly, reasons must be considerations we can reason from, but we cannot reason from incentives to belief. In the first half of the paper, I show that this argument fails: the claim that we cannot reason from incentives is either false or does not combine with the reasoning constraint to support evidentialism. However, the failure of this argument suggests an alternative route to evidentialism. Roughly, reasons must be premises of good reasoning, but it is not good reasoning to reason from incentives to belief. The second half of the paper develops and defends this argument for evidentialism.
Keywords Evidentialism  Pragmatic Reasons for Belief  Reasons  Reasoning
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqw026
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

View all 42 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Equal Treatment for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.
The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
Weighing Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.
A New Argument for Pragmatism?Anthony Robert Booth - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (2):227-231.
Transparency and the Ethics of Belief.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1191-1201.
Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
A New Argument for Evidentialism?Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.
Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief.Dorit Ganson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):441 - 458.
A New Argument for Evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
Evidentialism, Circularity, and Grounding.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1847-1868.
Sanctifying Evidentialism.Horace Fairlamb - 2010 - Religious Studies 46 (1):61-76.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-22

Total views
407 ( #18,551 of 2,420,820 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
54 ( #14,419 of 2,420,820 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes