Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):425–431 (2003)

Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Nick Bostrom argues that if we accept some plausible assumptions about how the future will unfold, we should believe we are probably not humans. The argument appeals crucially to an indifference principle whose precise content is a little unclear. I set out four possible interpretations of the principle, none of which can be used to support Bostrom’s argument. On the first two interpretations the principle is false, on the third it does not entail the conclusion, and on the fourth it only entails the conclusion given an auxiliary hypothesis that we have no reason to believe.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00323
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References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
The Roots of Reference.W. V. Quine - 1974 - Lasalle, Ill., Open Court.
Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?Nick Bostrom - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):243-255.

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Citations of this work BETA

1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.
The Simulation Argument Again.Anthony Brueckner - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):224-226.
The Simulation Argument: Reply to Weatherson.Nick Bostrom - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):90 - 97.

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