Explanation, Entailment, and Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments

Metaphysica 10 (1):97-108 (2009)
Abstract
I argue that there are Leibnizian-style cosmological arguments for the existence of God which start from very mild premises which affirm the mere possibility of a principle of sufficient reason. The utilization of such premises gives a great deal of plausibility to such types of argumentation. I spend the majority of the paper defending three major objections to such mild premises viz., a reductio argument from Peter van Inwagen and William Rowe, which proffers and defends the idea that a necessary proposition cannot explain a contingent one. I, then, turn to an amelioration of the Rowe/van Inwagen argument which attempts to appeal to an entailment relation between explanans and explanandum that is fettered out in terms of relevance logic. Subsequent to dispelling with that worry, I tackle objections to the utilization of weak principles of sufficient reason that depend essentially upon agglomerative accounts of explanation.
Keywords Explanation  Entailment  Cosmological Arguments  Principle of Sufficient Reason
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-008-0042-y
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References found in this work BETA
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Causality and Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1998 - Oxford University Press.

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