Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216 (2001)
This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, those resources will be brought to bear on the logic of conditionals.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1931 - Paterson, N.J., Littlefield, Adams.
Citations of this work BETA
Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts.Timothy Williamson - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.
On the Treatment of Incomparability in Ordering Semantics and Premise Semantics.Eric Swanson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):693-713.
Similar books and articles
Semantic Composition and Presupposition Projection in Subjunctive Conditionals.Michela Ippolito - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):631 - 672.
Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals.Daniel Nolan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):215-269.
On the Tense Structure of Conditionals.Diane Barense - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:539-566.
Subjunctive Biscuit and Stand-Off Conditionals.Eric Swanson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads111 ( #44,094 of 2,163,620 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,270 of 2,163,620 )
How can I increase my downloads?