Indicative and subjunctive conditionals

Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216 (2001)
Abstract
This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, those resources will be brought to bear on the logic of conditionals.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00224
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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.

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