Cambridge Journal of Economics 26 (1):47-62 (2002)

Authors
Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Uncertainty plays an important role in The General Theory, particularly in the theory of interest rates. Keynes did not provide a theory of uncertainty, but he did make some enlightening remarks about the direction he thought such a theory should take. I argue that some modern innovations in the theory of probability allow us to build a theory which captures these Keynesian insights. If this is the right theory, however, uncertainty cannot carry its weight in Keynes’s arguments. This does not mean that the conclusions of these arguments are necessarily mistaken; in their best formulation they may succeed with merely an appeal to risk.
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
A Treatise on Probability.John Maynard Keynes - 1921 - London, England: Dover Publications.
A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
Truth and Probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153-179.
The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.
Against Radical Credal Imprecision.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.
From Values to Probabilities.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3901-3929.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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