Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-27 (2004)

Authors
Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Authors have a lot of leeway with regard to what they can make true in their story. In general, if the author says that p is true in the fiction we’re reading, we believe that p is true in that fiction. And if we’re playing along with the fictional game, we imagine that, along with everything else in the story, p is true. But there are exceptions to these general principles. Many authors, most notably Kendall Walton and Tamar Szabó Gendler, have discussed apparent counterexamples when p is “morally deviant”. Many other statements that are conceptually impossible also seem to be counterexamples. In this paper I do four things. I survey the range of counterexamples, or at least putative counterexamples, to the principles. Then I look to explanations of the counterexamples. I argue, following Gendler, that the explanation cannot simply be that morally deviant claims are impossible. I argue that the distinctive attitudes we have towards moral propositions cannot explain the counterexamples, since some of the examples don’t involve moral concepts. And I put forward a proposed explanation that turns on the role of ‘higher-level concepts’, concepts that if they are satisfied are satisfied in virtue of more fundamental facts about the world, in fiction, and in imagination.
Keywords Aesthetics, Imagination, Resistance, Fictionality, Dissertation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,704
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind.Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Imagining Stories: Attitudes and Operators.Neil Van Leeuwen - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 46 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
246 ( #31,871 of 2,340,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #83,570 of 2,340,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes