Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163 (2014)
AbstractI defend normative externalism from the objection that it cannot account for the wrongfulness of moral recklessness. The defence is fairly simple—there is no wrong of moral recklessness. There is an intuitive argument by analogy that there should be a wrong of moral recklessness, and the bulk of the paper consists of a response to this analogy. A central part of my response is that if people were motivated to avoid moral recklessness, they would have to have an unpleasant sort of motivation, what Michael Smith calls “moral fetishism”.
Similar books and articles
Deontology, individualism, and uncertainty, a reply to Jackson and Smith.Ron Aboodi, Adi Borer & and David Enoch - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (5):259-272.
Home birth: Consumer choice and restriction of physician autonomy.Not By Me - 1987 - Journal of Business Ethics 6 (6).
Home Birth: Consumer Choice and Restriction of Physician Autonomy. [REVIEW]Paul Thompson - 1987 - Journal of Business Ethics 6 (6):481 - 487.
Quantification, Regulation, and Risk Assessment.Douglas MacLean - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:243 - 260.
Equating innocent threats and bystanders.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):277-290.
Coercion and Moral Blameworthiness.Lloyd Fields - 2001 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):135-151.
Commonalities in Time and Ambiguity Aversion for Long-Term Risks.Harrell W. Chesson & W. Kip Viscusi - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (1):57-71.
Management and ethical decision-making.Wade L. Robison - 1984 - Journal of Business Ethics 3 (4):287 - 291.
Running in place or running in its proper place.J. P. Moreland - 2007 - In Michael W. Austin (ed.), Running and Philosophy: A Marathon for the Mind. Blackwell.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.
One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
Why Maximize Expected Choice‐Worthiness?1.William MacAskill & Toby Ord - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):327-353.
References found in this work
Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2002 - Oxford University Press.