Stages, Worms, slices and lumps

Abstract
Assume, for fun, that temporal parts theory is true, and that some kind of modal realism (perhaps based on ersatz worlds) is true. Within this grand metaphysical picture, what are the ordinary objects? Do they have many temporal parts, or just one? Do they have many modal parts, or just one? I survey the issues involved in answering this question, including the problem of temporary intrinsics, the problem of the many, Kripke's objections to counterpart theory and quantifier domain restrictions.
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Modalising Plurals.Simon Hewitt - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):853-875.
Talking About a Universalist World.David Braddon-Mitchell & Kristie Miller - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):499-534.

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