True, Truer, Truest

Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):47-70 (2005)
Brian Weatherson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
What the world needs now is another theory of vagueness. Not because the old theories are useless. Quite the contrary, the old theories provide many of the materials we need to construct the truest theory of vagueness ever seen. The theory shall be similar in motivation to supervaluationism, but more akin to many-valued theories in conceptualisation. What I take from the many-valued theories is the idea that some sentences can be truer than others. But I say very different things to the ordering over sentences this relation generates. I say it is not a linear ordering, so it cannot be represented by the real numbers. I also argue that since there is higher-order vagueness, any mapping between sentences and mathematical objects is bound to be inappropriate. This is no cause for regret; we can say all we want to say by using the comparative truer than without mapping it onto some mathematical objects. From supervaluationism I take the idea that we can keep classical logic without keeping the familiar bivalent semantics for classical logic. But my preservation of classical logic is more comprehensive than is normally permitted by supervaluationism, for I preserve classical inference rules as well as classical sequents. And I do this without relying on the concept of acceptable precisifications as an unexplained explainer. The world does not need another guide to varieties of theories of vagueness, especially since Timothy Williamson (1994) and Rosanna Keefe (2000) have already provided quite good guides. I assume throughout familiarity with popular theories of vagueness.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-5218-x
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Studies in the Way of Words.H. Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.
A Model of Tolerance.Elia Zardini - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (3):337-368.
Rumfitt on Truth-Grounds, Negation, and Vagueness.Richard Zach - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2079-2089.

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