What good are counterexamples?

Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31 (2003)
Abstract
Intuitively, Gettier cases are instances of justified true beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. Should we therefore conclude that knowledge is not justified true belief? Only if we have reason to trust intuition here. But intuitions are unreliable in a wide range of cases. And it can be argued that the Gettier intuitions have a greater resemblance to unreliable intuitions than to reliable intuitions. Whats distinctive about the faulty intuitions, I argue, is that respecting them would mean abandoning a simple, systematic and largely successful theory in favour of a complicated, disjunctive and idiosyncratic theory. So maybe respecting the Gettier intuitions was the wrong reaction, we should instead have been explaining why we are all so easily misled by these kinds of cases.
Keywords Gettier  intuitions  JTB analysis
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1024961917413
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.

View all 69 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Saving the Doxastic Account of Intuitions.Christian Nimtz - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):357-375.
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.
Introduction.Carol Mason Spicer - 1996 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 6 (4):ix-x.
Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?John Turri - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Seemingly Semantic Intuitions.Kent Bach - 2002 - In Joseph K. Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth - Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 21--33.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
724 ( #1,852 of 2,210,003 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
170 ( #807 of 2,210,003 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature