Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):487-511 (2005)

Authors
Michael Weber
Bowling Green State University
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Martha Nussbaum's Aristotelian analysis of compassion and pity is faulty, largely because she fails to distinguish between an emotion's basic constitutive conditions and the associated constitutive or "intrinsic" norms, "extrinsic" normative conditions, for instance, instrumental and moral considerations, and the causal conditions under which emotion is most likely to be experienced. I also argue that her defense of compassion and pity as morally valuable emotions is inadequate because she treats a wide variety of objections as all stemming from a common commitment to a Stoic conception of the good. I argue that these objections can be construed as neutral between conceptions of the good. I conclude by arguing that construed in this way there are nonetheless plausible replies to these objections.
Keywords Philosophy   Ethics   Ontology   Political Philosophy
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-005-3714-5
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References found in this work BETA

The Passions.Robert C. Solomon - 1976 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Upheavals of Thought.Martha Nussbaum - 2001 - Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (2):325-341.

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Citations of this work BETA

Compassion and Beyond.Roger Crisp - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):233-246.
Liars, Medicine, and Compassion.L. W. Ekstrom - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (2):159-180.
Pity: A Mitigated Defence.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):343-364.
A New Moral Sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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