Context-Dependence in Searle’s Impossibility Argument: A Reply to Butchard and D’Amico

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3):433-444 (2012)
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Abstract

John Searle claims that social-scientific laws are impossible because social phenomena are physically open-ended. William Butchard and Robert D’Amico have recently argued that, by Searle’s own lights, money is a social phenomena that is physically closed. However, Butchard and D’Amico rely on a limited set of data in order to draw this conclusion, and fail to appreciate the implications of Searle’s theory of social ontology with regard to the physical open-endedness of money. Money is not physically open-ended in the strong sense that Butchard and D’Amico require, and their argument for the possibility of social-scientific laws fails as a result

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References found in this work

Minds, Brains and Science.John R. Searle - 1984 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Minds, Brains and Science.Stephen P. Stich - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (1):129.
Intentionalistic explanations in the social sciences.John R. Searle - 1991 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):332-344.

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