Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):533-548 (2016)

Authors
Zach Weber
University of Otago
Guillermo Badia
University of Queensland
Abstract
ABSTRACTDo truth tables—the ordinary sort that we use in teaching and explaining basic propositional logic—require an assumption of consistency for their construction? In this essay we show that truth tables can be built in a consistency-independent paraconsistent setting, without any appeal to classical logic. This is evidence for a more general claim—that when we write down the orthodox semantic clauses for a logic, whatever logic we presuppose in the background will be the logic that appears in the foreground. Rather than any one logic being privileged, then, on this count partisans across the logical spectrum are in relatively similar dialectical positions.
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2015.1093010
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References found in this work BETA

What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Saving Truth From Paradox.Hartry Field - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
Ultralogic as Universal?Richard Routley - 2019 - Springer Verlag.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
The Cut‐Free Approach and the Admissibility‐Curry.Ulf Hlobil - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):40-48.
Dialetheism.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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