Marc Andree Weber
Universität Mannheim
Theories of personal identity face a paradox, which traces back to Bernard Williams: some scenarios obviously show that mental continuity is what solely matters in survival; others, on the contrary, show with equal obviousness that it is bodily continuity. Different authors have produced diverging and partly conflicting answers in response to that problem. Based on recent research concerning the structure of philosophical thought experiment, this paper reevaluates and, for the first time, neatly classifies those answers. What is more, several existing approaches of how to answer the paradox are developed further, and two new answers are introduced.
Keywords Personal Identity  Williams, Bernard  Thought Experiments  Brain Transfer  Mental Continuity  Bodily Continuity
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DOI 10.3196/004433017820875819
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Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity.B. A. O. Williams - 1960 - Analysis 21 (December):43-48.

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